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The Argumentative Creation of
Individual Liberty
By

WARREN SANDMANN*

What is the meaning of the term "liberty"? Michael McGee recounts an anecdote that provides one opening to this question.' McGee retells the story of Antun Robecick, a retired steelworker from
Gary, Indiana, who returned to his native Yugoslavia in the late
1970's. Robecick compares the "freedom" of Yugoslavia, a totalitarian regime controlled by one man (but where he feels safe to walk the
streets at night), with the "freedom" of the United States (where he
could say and think what he desired, but felt like a prisoner in his own
house). Robecick is hard pressed to decide which country is more
free, or which country, in other words, has more "liberty."2 As McGee notes, such a comparison seems nonsensical at first. However,
upon closer examination, it illustrates McGee's conception of liberty:
"We are not 'free' by fiat of definition or declaration, but by virtue of
our feeling in the presence of the life conditions we must face daily."3
McGee is talking about a particular discursive and material conception of the idea of "liberty," a word/symbol and a material condition. From where does this symbol/material condition arise? McGee
argues that the origin of the "idea" of "liberty" came not from the
minds and pens of an intellectual elite (social idealism), but from the
real material experiences (social materialism) of the people of a society. This is a grounded liberty, an idea and material practice that is
derived from the commonly felt and shared experiences of a people at
a particular time and place. McGee describes liberty as "neither invention, form, nor fact. It is, as Edmund Burke suggested two centuries ago, precisely a 'spirit' which resides in the collective
consciousness of ordinary citizens." 4 In other words, "liberty" is a collective sense or feeling which resides in individuals who share com* Lecturer, San Jose State University, Department of Communication Studies.
1. Michael C. McGee, The Origins of 'Liberty': A Feminization of Power, 47 Comm.
MONOGRAPHs 23 (1980) [hereinafter Origins].
2. litat 24.

3. Id.at 28.
4. Id.at 25.
[637]
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mon experiences of a society. More precisely, we derive a "liberty" in
response to facing a particular manifestation of a common societal experience, such as the expression of governmental power. Liberty, McGee argues, is precisely that "feeling" or "spirit" that a people
experience when faced with the power of government. We "know"
liberty in opposition, or in connection, with power. "Liberty" and
"power" are both material and symbolic. They are real effects upon
people's lives and represent "ideas" that are experienced by the
people.
McGee argues that in Peter Wentworth's 1576 speech to Parliament (which was actually a speech intended for the ears of Queen
Elizabeth), we can see an example of this "grounded" liberty.
Wentworth could and did assume that the symbols/ideas/text he utilized in his persuasive message would be a part of the collective experience of his audience:
[H]is speech is nothing more nor less than a reflection of the
'consciousness' of his generation. If there is a sophisticated attitude toward Anglo-American notions of 'liberty' in this speech,
it derives not from the genius of an individual's mind but from
the individual's 'presence' in the collective consciousness of
government.5
McGee's discussion of the concept of "liberty" is a specific example of his more general discussion of the rhetorical concept of the ideograph. 6 McGee argues that ideographs are collections of "political
language" which manifest ideology in their "capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior."7 As such, the ideograph
encompasses both the materialist concept of ideology and the symbolist conception of myth. Ideographs, which are prevalent in our political language, function both to support material power and to alter
social reality through linguistic practices. Ideology as manifested in
the ideograph is, in essence, a symbolic enthymeme. Given our existence and participation in a mass consciousness, the use of a term such
as "liberty" to justify behavior such as war makes the ideograph "liberty" an enthymeme calling up an appropriate response on the part of
the members of the mass consciousness and mass audience.
What is important in understanding the concept of the ideograph
is that it is more than a term or collection of terms that is used to
create a "poetic myth": ideographs call forth specific behaviors from
5. Id. at 30.
6. Michael C. McGee, The 'Ideograph:A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 66
QUARTERLY J. OF SPEECH 1 (1980) [hereinafter Ideograph].

7. Id. at 5.
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individuals and groups, and manifest themselves in material actions.
As McGee puts it, "[t]he important fact about ideographs is that they
exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of
political consciousness." ' Ideographs, in other words, offer justifications for behavior, and help us to answer the question, Why did they
(we) do that? Ideographs are the symbols that we use (and that use
us) to create our world. And that created world is the only world we
have, since our only way of making sense of the world is through
symbols.
What is most interesting in this discussion of the ideograph and
the specific case of "liberty" for the purposes of this Essay is McGee's
claim that the "idea" of liberty arose from the material practices and
experiences of the common people. As such, these practices and experiences would have been part of the "public sphere" of discourse.'
Interactions between the people and their government are, by definition in a democracy, a "public" matter. But what about interactions
that occur within the government itself, especially a branch of the government that, in democracies, is designed to be "above" the politics of
the interaction between the government and the people?
The arguments and decisions of the judiciary in a democracy, especially once a case has risen to the appellate level, are generally ones
that do not involve the public. These arguments and decisions, of
course, affect the public, but they are, in theory, designed to be apart
from the public. The judiciary, it is generally argued, functions not
according to the whims of the public, but according to the dictates of
the law. And the law, it is also generally argued (though, of course,
not universally believed), is a constant, a guidepost by which decisions
are made.
If decisions by the judiciary utilize, interpret, and then dictate a
specific meaning for an idea such as "liberty," from where does this
final meaning arise? This question will be the major focus of this Essay. To attempt to answer this question, Part I will first review some
of the work on the notion of spheres or places of argument. Part II
will look at legal decisionmaking as argument, and discuss theories of
legal decisionmaking. Finally, Part III will examine the specific legal
arguments concerning the idea of "liberty" in Lochner v. New York.' °
8. Id at 7.
9. G. Thomas Goodnight, The Personal Technica and Public Spheres of Argument:
OF THE AM. FORENSIC ASS'N 214 (1982).

A Speculative Inquiry into the Art ofPublic Deliberation,18 JoURNAL
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Part III will also attempt to answer these questions: what does "liberty" mean? How was this decision made? From where did this "liberty" arise? What effect did it have on the public? In conclusion, I
hope to discover whether McGee's concept of the ideograph functions
within legal argument, or if legal argument is indeed generally the
writings of the intellectual few.
In this Essay, when I discuss argument, I do not generally distinguish it from other forms of rhetoric. There are many scholars of
communication who draw clear distinctions between what is argument
and what is rhetoric, or what is argument and what is persuasion. I
have never personally been able to discover such clear distinctions. I
find myself more in agreement with Chaim Perelman, who linked argument and rhetoric in stating that "[t]he aim of argumentation is not
to deduce consequences from given premises; it is rather to elicit or
increase the adherence of the members of an audience to theses that
are presented for their consent."" In other words, argument requires
both persuasion and rhetoric. Therefore, in this Essay, the terms argument, persuasion, and rhetoric will be used interchangeably.
I. Spheres of Argument
The concept of "spheres" of argument is an idea that has been
around for thousands of years. Aristotle and Cicero, among others,
wrote of common places that were the site of reasons and claims to be
used in arguments. However, the term "sphere" is generally most associated with Thomas Goodnight's 1982 Essay.' 2 This review will begin earlier,
by looking at Stephen Toulmin's work on argument
3
fields.'
In his book The Uses of Argument, Toulmin advanced a new approach for both conceiving and justifying arguments. He posited the
idea of "fields" of argument where each field was determined by the
type of backing or conclusion used in each argument.' 4 Though Toulmin used the term "logic" to describe these types, he went to great
pains to distinguish this use of the term "logic" from its historical
roots concerning deductive arguments and the syllogistic and analytic
forms. The concept of fields of arguments proved useful to Toulmin in
assessing different arguments and their conclusions. He first argued
that because arguments fall into different fields, the backings used to
11. CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RmHroRIc 9 (William Kluback, trans. 1982).

12. See Goodnight, supra note 9.
13. See generally STEPHEN E. TouLmN, THE UsEs
14. Id. at 14.

OF ARGUMENT

(1958).
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substantiate these arguments also come from different fields. Necessarily, then, the method to assess these arguments must vary from
field to field. He also argued against any sort of absolute standard for
an assessment of arguments, stating that knowledge simply cannot be
reduced to an absolute standard that exists outside of a contextual
field."5
In describing argument fields, Toulmin created very specific
places for examining arguments. An argument field was best understood by looking at the argument, at how it was created, what was
acceptable for supporting evidence, how conclusions were drawn, and
how arguments were judged as acceptable or not. In adapting Toulmin's formulation, many argument scholars of the 1980's expanded
the size of the fields and decreased the number of the fields. Instead
of closely aligning an argument type to a specific field, scholars such as
Goodnight offered the concept of spheres of argument. As Goodnight explained it, spheres were similar to Toulmin's notion of fields of
argument, in that spheres too were denoted by "the grounds upon
which arguments are built and the authorities to which arguers appeal."'1 6 Instead of specific argument fields, however, Goodnight proposed three spheres of argument: the personal, public, and technical.
Goodnight's major concern was with the public sphere, the place
where arguments that could not be solved in the personal and technical spheres are resolved, and the place that is open to the most active
participation by the most people. Goodnight feared that the public
sphere was being "steadily eroded by the elevation of the personal
and technical groundings of argument."' 7 The public sphere should
be a place where people engage in deliberative rhetoric, generating
discourse that is capable of creating discussion and consensus. In this
public sphere, the conditions for the creation and adjudication of arguments would not be as stringent as in the technical sphere, nor as
singular as in the personal sphere. Goodnight also argued that one of
the functions of argument scholars and critics should be to uncover
and critique instances where alternatives to deliberative rhetoric were
being practiced in place of deliberative rhetoric, so as to make more
possible true public argument.' 8
Of course, Goodnight's approach was not without its critics.
Some writers questioned his concern with the erosion of the public
15. TOULMN, supra note 13, at 240.
16. Goodnight, supra note 9, at 216.
17. Goodnight, supra note 9, at 220.

18. Goodnight, supra note 9, at 227.
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sphere. Thomas Peters argued that the seeming emergence of the
technical sphere was an evolution of the public, not an erosion of it.' 9
He called for argument theorists to be less concerned with the drawing of distinctions between spheres, and instead to show a "greater
appreciation of the similarity of arguments between spheres."20 Further, Cori Dauber seconded Peters's critique, and called on scholars to
concern themselves with discovering means of increasing public participation in arguments, regardless of the sphere.2 ' Schiappa worried
that the emphasis on making distinctions and classifying argument
types could lead to a reification and concretization of the spheres, and
an increase in the eminence of the technical sphere.22
The argument over spheres and fields of arguments has continued. While there are a number of issues of interest to the argument
scholar, there are a few important issues for the purpose of this Essay.
First, in McGee's formulation of the development of the ideograph,
the process seems to be primarily focused in the public sphere. The
process also uses the "consubstantiality" appeals of the personal
sphere, engaging in a more public voice. 23 If this reading of the development of the ideograph is accurate, arguments that are in a technical
and more specialized field may not be a part of the process by which
ideographs help to shape the form of the debate and its outcome. Or
they may be constituted by an ideograph that is only applicable to that
field (which, in essence, would then not meet the definition of an
ideograph).
The question about legal argument is whether it is part of a technical and specialized field with argumentative forms, claims, grounds,
and judgments in a realm separate from the larger public. This has
been the traditional understanding of the process of the law, an under'24 If
standing that goes largely by the heading of "legal formalism.
this understanding is correct, then ideographs by definition could not
be a part of legal argument although they may still influence legal
argument. However, other commentators question that traditional
19. Thomas N. Peters, On the Natural Development of Public Activity: A Critique of
Goodnight's Theory of Argument, in SPHERES OF ARGUMENT. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
SCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 26 (Bruce E. Gronbeck et al., eds. 1989)
[hereinafter SPHERES OF ARGUMENT].
20. Peters, in SPHERES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 19, at 31.
21. Cori Dauber, Fusion Criticism: A Call to Criticism, in SPHERES OF ARGUMENT,

supra note 19, at 33.
22. Edward Schiappa, 'Spheres of Argument' as Topoi for the CriticalStudy of Power!
Knowledge, in SPHERES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 19, at 47-48.
23. Goodnight, supra note 9, at 216.
24. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1 (1986).
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notion of legal argument and legal reasoning. The next section of this
Essay will discuss some of the competing theories of legal reasoning
and decisionmaking in order to determine the place of ideographs in
legal arguments.
A. Legal Argument

The relationship between legal reasoning and argumentation is a
long one. Cicero was both a master rhetorician and one of the most
skilled lawyers in ancient Rome. Law has often been cited as the paradigmatic mode of argument,25 but that relationship has been questioned both by scholars of law26 and argument.27 Frederic Gale offers
one of the more contemporary and thorough retellings of the relationship between law and argument.
Understanding the relationship between law and argument requires going back to the time of Aristotle when there was a split between rhetoric and truth' and an acceptance by most intellectuals of
Plato and Aristotle's degradation of rhetoric as a substitute method of
inquiry, a method to be used only when the more rigorous methods of
dialectic or scientific inquiry were unavailable. This split is between
the objectivity of values and ideals and the subjectivity of values and
ideals, a split between understanding the world from the standpoint of
physis (that there exists in the material world ideal forms and values
that can be used as means to evaluate decisions) and nomos (that ideals and values used to judge humanity are the creation of humanity).
Gale links this time of the pre-Sophists to contemporary rhetorical
theory, noting how this split is played out over and over again, with
one view taking precedence during one era, and the other during another era. Cicero and his intellectual followers are portrayed by Gale
as picturing rhetoric as an aid to knowledge. For example, Vico,
Hume, Nietzsche, and Perelman take the more sophistic view that
rhetoric is a constituent element of knowledge, aligning themselves
with "theories
that assume language is fused with thought by social
'29
practices.
25. TOULMIN, supra note 13, at 8.
26. See generally FREDERIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACy: RIMTORIC, IDEOLOGY,

AND THE PossmmrrY OF JusncE (1994).
27. See generally Geoffrey D. Klinger, Law as Communicative Praxis: Toward A Rhetorical Jurisprudence,30 ARGUMENTATION AND ADvoc. 236 (1994).
28. See generally Warren Sandmann, Logic and Emotion, Persuasionand Argumentation: 'Good Reasons' as an Educational Synthesis, BASIC COMM. COURSE ANN. III 123

(1991).
29. GALE, supra note 26, at 23.
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Gale notes the prominence of Burke in the struggle to reassert
the constitutive power of rhetoric, but also notes that the split remains
in the current Cartesian paradox in language and rhetoric, as well as in
the current paradox between the epistemic and ontologic qualities of
rhetoric. Both of these paradoxes are struggles to understand the role
of language and the relationship between language and knowledge:
Does language exist as a correlate to an object, as a mirror of that
object, or as a socially-agreed upon way to respond to the idea of that
object? Gale's discussion of the ideological nature of rhetoric offers
the perspective that language is a constitutive element of knowledge.
Thus, in discussing the rhetoric of law, Gale reminds us that the critical stance cannot rise above the language or ideology in which it is
embedded to discuss and critique from an objective stance, but that
the role of the critic is to discover through textual analysis the ideological position of the rhetoric.3 °
Gale next moves to the debate between the Sophists and the
Platonists. He claims that the Sophistic philosophy is far more important to legal interpretation than is Platonic philosophy because the
Sophists understood the relativistic nature of truth in law. This battle
and understanding has continued in both language theory and law,
with legal realists seen as sophists and legal formalists as Platonists,
with Richard Rorty as a contemporary sophist, and Jurgen Habermas
as a neo-Platonist. In between these two positions lie social constructionists and deconstructionists in language theory. The sophistic notion of the relativity of truth argues that we must utilize this
provisional truth as we make decisions both in the larger society and
in law.3 1
The medieval period saw the rise of natural law, the Judeo-Chris-tian concept that grounded law and justice in the divine nature of
God, and the idea first promoted by Hugh Grotius that natural law
was founded on both the social contract and the ability of reason.32
The role and place of reason is the key here, for it is reason that allows
this form of natural law to rise above and transcend "mere" social law
or law by agreement. Reason provides this form of natural law an
objective detachment that is missing from the social compact, and thus
also adds to the legitimacy of law. What this also leads to, however, is
what Gale calls the paradox of the aporia. Law must be simultaneously an application of the "correct" law, and also a choice between
30. GALE, supra note 26, at 27.
31. GALE, supra note 26, at 29.
32. GALE, supra note 26, at 37.

Spring 1996]

ARGUMENTATIVE CREATION OF LIBERTY

645

affirming and rejecting that law. But if the law requires choice, then
the law is not "correct" or transcendent. And if it is "correct," then
no choice should be required. This is still the quintessential paradox
facing legal theorists today 33
who search for a metatheory which will
justify legal decisionmaking.
Just as in the past, the basic division in contemporary legal theory
remains the division betveen objective and subjective approaches to
law, a continuing division between physis and nomos (a division that is
similar to the division in almost all of the humanities and social sciences). The basic approaches to legal theory are representative of this
continuing split: some are primarily objective (formalism and positivism), and others are primarily subjective (realism and pragmatism).
Legal formalism, as noted above, is in its many guises one of the
more dominant approaches to judicial decisionmaking. In its most basic form, legal formalism is seen as exactly that: "a formula that will
yield a 'consistent' line of judicial interpretations. '34 Formalism, Gale
argues, claims to be an objective approach to the law, a restatement of
Plato's dialectic that is removed from the ideology of interpretation.
Objectivism is defined by Gale as any philosophical position that asserts that the truth of a proposition is independent of the particular
context in which it is found, and transcends the particular to become a
universal proposition. Thus Gale finds legal formalism to be not a
distinct theory but rather a type of objectivism.
Legal formalism, however, is distinct from other forms of objectivism in that it does not exclude the moral dimension, but instead
requires it. Legal formalism is about the formalistic process of attaining legal and social morality. Gale cites Ronald Dworkin as representative of this way of interpreting the law, as his approach of legal
interpretation puts forth the history of past law as the objective foundation of interpretation. Dworkin offers a "chain novel" theory of
interpretation, picturing legal interpretation as a series of opinions
written by judges who are bound by precedent.35 It is as if judges are
novelists who start writing a novel after another person has created all
the characters and scenes and "rules" for the novel. The opinionwriter must fit his opinion in with the already begun novel. This history, Dworkin claims, is above individual interpretations, and therefore is separate from the interpretive process. Gale argues that this
approach works well in the "easy" cases where history and precedent
33. GALE, supra note 26, at 39.
34. GAL, supra note 26, at 46.

35. See generally RONALD

DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPiRE (1986).
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is clear, but fails to offer a clear justification in the "hard" cases where
many histories are available.
36
Stanley Fish offers another critique and take on legal formalism.
Fish argues, in essence, that a search for history to bind a judge in
writing an opinion is both impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible in that the history that a judge uses is still an interpretive history,
not an objective foundation; and it is unnecessary in that the legal
interpretive community constrains judges in their opinion-writing.
The lack of a foundational grounding for legal interpretation will not
lead to judicial anarchy, tyranny, or lack of legitimacy because of the
hegemonic quality of the legal community. 37
Legal positivism, Gale argues, is another form of objectivism, but
is distinct from formalism in one important way. While legal formalists believe that law is objective and discoverable and that it objectively exists and can be logically deduced and applied, legal positivists
believe that law is a choice between competing social values. However, the process of applying these social choices is still an objective
process. It is as if the ontology of law is subjective-that is, the competing social choices are political-but the epistemology is objective.
This approach is similar to other social sciences in their search for
scientific principles by which to make social decisions.
Both legal formalism and legal positivism are on the objective
end of the continuum between objectivity in interpretation and subjectivity. Legal realism, however, is on the subjective end. In discussing legal realism, Gale points out that as divine authority as a source
of certainty in law decreased, a need for another form of validation
arose. Objective standards of science, however, are unable to meet
the needs of social issues. The alternative is a more subjective approach, an understanding that knowledge is both created and therefore validated by human experience. Legal realism is a form of
subjective validation. Its goal is not the objective discovery and application of law, but the practice of legal interpretation designed to improve the social good. To the legal realist, the subjective values of the
judge and society are relevant to the decision. "For realists the object
of law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences.1 38 It is important in understanding legal realism that only
extreme adherents believe that the law is completely subjective.
36. See generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989).

37. Md at 93.
38. GALE, supra note 26, at 58.
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Somewhat aligned with the legal realists are the legal pragmatists
who argue that legal decisionmaking is justified not by foundational
rules nor subjective values alone, but instead by basic utilitarian prin-

ciples. Law is justified by its usefulness to society and its purpose in
increasing the "wealth" of societal members. Gale labels Richard Pos-

ner as a legal pragmatist.3 9 Posner agrees that precedent is binding,
but that the key is how precedent is read.4 ° The judge is not free to
decide however he wishes: the legal culture restrains the judge in its
determination of what counts as a reasonable decision. In essence,
Posner's judge uses precedent guided by (1) the arguments of adversaries which present competing versions of the relevant precedents, (2)
practical reason which is the accumulated knowledge of a legal education, (3) the culture of law which supports or4 suppresses certain decisions, and (4) the "usefulness" of the result. '
Along with the above interpretive approaches, there are a
number of other contemporary approaches to legal decisionmaking
that need a brief overview. Despite contradictions and questions
within the legal profession, the traditional notion that law is above
questions of politics and ideology is still the grounding approach to
the practice and theorization of law, with its premise that the function
of legal theorizing is mainly to "describe and justify the role of the
judiciary in a liberal democracy."'42 It is out of and in response to this
tradition that the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement arises.
The basic and generally agreed upon premise of CLS is that the
main function of the movement is to expose law as a political and
ideological agency, a means for supporting the existing (and oppressive) status quo, and a means to reify that status quo as normal or as
not being a political or ideological choice. Beyond that premise, there
is more difference than agreement among those who see themselves as
a part of the CLS movement.
Gale posits two basic groupings within the CLS movement. First,
those who are in essence super-realists who want to extend the realist
attack upon legal theory, but who still insist that much of the traditional notion of law should remain. They acknowledge the ideological
and political nature of law, but point out that lawyers and judges are
still bound within the tradition (either procedurally or linguistically),
and that the tradition and precedent of law must and should still bind
39. See generally RICHARD A.
40. l at 95.
41. d.at 73.
42.

GALE,

POSNER,

supra note 26, at 66.

THE PROBLEMS

OF JURISPRUDENCE

(1990).
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judges. These include, according to Gale, those like Fish who argue
that there is a hegemony of legal training and discourse that binds
judges.
The other basic group that Gale posits is a group that he sees as
more radical because it calls for a new conception of law and announces a continuous critique of all traditional legal theory. This
more Marxian-influenced branch of CLS is more concerned with the
program of exposing traditional legal theory as the supporter and reifier of liberalism and its existing oppression which they call "'an instrument of social, economic and political domination, both in the
sense of furthering the concrete interests
of the dominators and in that
'4 3
of legitimating the existing order."'

The CLS movement arises from the understanding that all institutionalized discourses, including the law, inevitably privilege one position or people, and deprivilege other positions or people. Therefore,
there is a need to continually question that discourse. What is missing,
of course, is anything other than continual critique. CLS is seen by
many (including many of its adherents) as a program of critique which
does not offer any programmatic change." The CLS movement, like
many other critical approaches to traditional notions of knowledge
and society, appears to be caught between rejection of the liberal tradition, with its belief in rule of law and objectivity of reason, and
Marxist/Leninist deterministic programs that deny any role for the individual because of their belief in the deterministic power of social
structures.
Another contemporary approach to legal decisionmaking is
found in the application of the principles of deconstructionism.
Deconstructive analyses of legal theory demonstrate the way that
legal theories, which are designed to explain and clarify why and how
legal decisions, basically take control of the decision they are trying to
explain. The theory takes authorial intent away from the opinionwriter, and in essence, recreates or reinterprets the decision so as to
align it with the theory. This, in turn, subverts the theory which is
assigned to the opinion-writer as intent.
The purpose of this deconstruction is to point out the myths by
which we make our decisions and say that they are objective and
apolitical. This is designed to lead to a new and better way of seeing
how we could make decisions and thereby remake society. However,
this is not necessarily what deconstructionists are concerned with. The
43. GALE, supra note 26, at 71.
44. GALE, supra note 26, at 72.

Spring 1996]

ARGUMENTATIVE CREATION OF LIBERTY

649

problem, of course, is that when you deconstruct a literary text and
subvert the meaning of the author, you make little if any material difference. But when you deconstruct a law and subvert its meaning, you
may have a very significant and immediate impact on people's lives.
There are, of course, many other approaches to legal interpreta46
45
tion. These interpretations include Marxist, social constructionist,
feminist,4 7 semiotic, 4 8 and post-modernistic. 4 9 However, despite all
these theories, it is clear from reading contemporary Supreme Court
opinions that legal formalism in some variety is still the dominant
mode of reasoning and justification of legal decisions. 50 Nevertheless,
even those who acknowledge the dominance of legal formalism argue
that it is formalism primarily in name only. Decisions are reached by
judges in ways that do not necessarily conform to the formalism of the
law, but are then defended by an artificial construction that on the
51
surface appears to be formalism.
Scholars such as Harry Wellington make the argument that legal
formalism alone cannot explain many of the decisions made by the
judicial system in the United States, especially at the appellate level
and most noticeably at the Supreme Court level. Wellington makes
the case that legal decisionmaking invariably involves public morality. 52 Wellington argues that it is impossible to understand many of
the more controversial decisions made by the court unless the role of
public morality is factored into the equation. Despite the assumed
deference to the plain meaning or original intent of a law, the Court
has many times departed from that deference, and departed from53it in
a way that shows their awareness of the role of public morality.
What does this mean for the purposes of this study? Given the
evidence that legal decisionmaking must involve some conception of
45. See generally ISAAc BALBUS, THE DIALECTICs OF LEGAL REPRESSION (1973).

46. See generally

RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE

(1979).
47. See generally Carol Smart, Feminist Jurisprudencein DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS:
RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL INJURISPRUDENCE 133 (Peter Fitzpatrick, ed. 1991) [hereinafter DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS].
48. See generally Peter Goodrich & Yifat Hachamovitch, Time out of Mind: An Introduction to the Semiotics of Common Law, in DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 47, at
159.
49. See generally Anthony Carty, English Constitutional Law from a Postmodernist
Perspective in DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 47, at 182.
50. Klinger, supra note 27, at 237.
51. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTTUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJuDICATION 78-82 (1990).
52. WELLINGTON, supra note 51, at 122.
53. WELLINGTON, supra note 51, at 121.
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the public good, from where does that conception arise? How does
the Court determine what it means by the "public good"? If such a
decision arises solely within the confines of the cloisters of the
Supreme Court, is it truly a "public" decision? Or are there influences
from the public that, in a sense, infect the arguments of the court?
Wellington claims that the process of decisionmaking itself creates the room and the need for this "infection" from the public to
enter the legal decisionmaking process. First, the interpretation of the
Constitution and the making of its meaning by the Supreme Court
takes place through a "dynamic, adversarial process" in which many
different groups, through their official representatives (the lawyers arguing the case), offer to the Court a variety of often conflicting interpretations of the law. 54 All of these interpretations, because they
must pass the muster of the artificiality of legal formalism, are plausible and defendable. 5
Wellington claims that in making these arguments advocates for
the different positions and interpretations couch their appeals in the
common language and common understandings of the general public. 5 6 In essence, therefore, the raw material that the Supreme Court,
and other appellate courts, have to work with includes not just the
plain meaning of the law, but also the often conflicting interpretations
of contemporary public argument. Additionally, Thomas Marshall
who systematically studied the relationship between Supreme Court
opinions and public opinion, makes the point that while there is no
proven, direct causation between public opinion and Supreme Court
opinions, those Supreme Court decisions that reflect public opinion
are more likely to prevail over longer periods of time than those decisions that ran counter to public opinion.5 7 Marshall also shows that
members of the Supreme Court are aware of public opinion in the
decisionmaking process. While public opinion is increasingly cited in
decisions, it is usually used to justify decisions that are a part of the
prevailing public opinion. There is as yet no clear evidence that public
opinion plays a decisive role in the decisionmaking process.
Despite the lack of causal connections, this knowledge and use of
public opinion offers additional support to Wellington's argument that
the public is involved in legal decisionmaking, even at the level of the
Supreme Court. Given this role for the public, it appears that legal
54. WELLINGTON, supra note 51, at

79.

55.
56.

WELLINGTON,
WELLINGTON,

supra note 51, at 80.
supra note 51, at 80.

57.

THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 181 (1989).
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decisionmaking shares enough of the characteristics of other contem-

porary deliberative forums that it should be possible to discover
within certain cases where and to what extent the public played a role
in the process and outcome. The remainder of this Essay will offer an

analysis of the 1905 Supreme Court decision in Lochner, and will specifically look at the manner in which the Court arrives at its concept of

"liberty."
H. Lochner v. New York
The issue in Lochner v. New York 58 involved a New York state
law that limited the work hours of bakers to no more than sixty hours
a week. Justice Peckham wrote the majority opinion in the five-tofour decision that found the law to be an unconstitutional infringement upon the rights of both employers and employees to engage in
contractual labor agreements.
Justice Peckham's decision involved an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to all individuals in the United
States. Justice Peckham argued that the "general right to make a contract in relation to [ ] business is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," that "[t]he right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment," and that therefore states in general have no right to interfere
with the rights of either employers or employees in contractual
agreements.59
There is, of course, an exception to this general principle. This
exception is what Justice Peckham referred to as the "vaguely termed
police powers."0 While the state's police powers have no specific and
defined meaning, Justice Peckham stated that they are generally held
to allow the state to interfere with the liberty of individuals if the interference is clearly connected to the "safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. ' 61 According to Justice Peckham, the basic
question was whether "this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty." 62
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. IM at 53.

60. Id
61. Id.
62. Iti at 56.
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In Lochner, Justice Peckham continued, the answer to this question was fairly obvious. First, he dismissed the claim that the law
should be considered valid simply as a labor law. Clearly, Justice
Peckham argued, there was "no reasonable ground for interfering
with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining
the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.163 Bakers, he continued, are perfectly capable of taking care of themselves and of determining the amount of time they can and should be allowed to work. 6
The only way this law could be upheld as a valid application of a
state's police powers, Justice Peckham argued, would be on the
grounds of the health of bakers. In this instance as well, Peckham
claimed, it was clear that the law was an unnecessary infringement
upon the right to contract because there was no direct connection between hours of employment as a baker and health problems of a
baker. Furthermore, the police powers of the state, Justice Peckham
stated, should be more concerned with the health and welfare of the
general public, and not any specific individual or class of individuals. 65
If such a law were allowed to stand, Peckham concluded, then the
reach of the state under the guise of police powers would appear to be
66
limitless.
In his concluding comments, Justice Peckham opined that the
New York law in question, while publicly proclaiming to be concerned
with the health and welfare of the public, was in fact of another nature. Instead of being concerned with "the purpose of protecting the
public health or welfare," laws such as the New York law are really
attempts "to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his
employ[ee]s," and are therefore in clear violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 67
There were two dissenting opinions in the case, with the Justice
Holmes dissent generally considered to be the more important of the
two. 68 The first dissent, written by Justice Harlan, presents the standard legal thinking of the time. Justice Harlan argued that the Court
was overstepping its authority in overturning the New York law. The
Court, Harlan claimed, was operating in opposition to the wishes of
the public as expressed by the legislature of New York. Justice Harlan
argued that the Court should practice deference to the decisions of the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id, at 57.
IM
I. at 58.
IM at 59.
It. at 64.
Wellington, supra note 51 at 63.

Spring 1996]

ARGUMENTATIVE CREATION OF LIBERTY

653

legislature, "for, the rule is universal that a legislative enactment... is
never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question,
plainly and palpably in excess of the legislative power. ' 69 In this case,
Justice Harlan concluded, it was clear that the New York law was
within the legislative power of the state, and that the Court could not
and should not invalidate a legislative enactment unless there was a
clear and express infringement of the Constitution.
It is in Justice Holmes' dissent that we find what has historically
been the major controversy in the Lochner decision. Holmes argued
that the majority opinion in Lochner was founded not upon a clear
reading of the law, but instead upon "an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain." It was Holmes' contention that the majority opinion was putting into practice not a legally
sound principle, but instead was writing into the law "a particular economic theory," that of laissez faire capitalism.7 °
In looking at the arguments presented in the majority and dissenting opinions, what formulations of the concept "liberty" are present? Justice Peckham's idea of "liberty" is quite apparent. All
individuals, regardless of class or occupation possess personal liberty
as an innate condition, which translates into the fundamental right to
do with their personhood whatsoever they wish, so long as it does not
violate the health or welfare of the general public.7 ' Harlan's "liberty" is a bit more limited, a "liberty" that requires that the state not
limit the rights of the individual "'to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation."' 7 2 Justice Holmes' "liberty" is less specifically spelled out, and also, apparently, much less expansive. It is
not the "liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others," a "liberty" that Justice Holmes
decries as a "shibboleth" for many who should know better.73 "Liberty" for Justice Holmes is a concept that has arisen from "the traditions of our people and our law."'74

69. 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

70. Id at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Id.at 59.

72. IM at 65-66 (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
73. Id at 949.
74. Id
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Origins of Liberty

From where do these concepts of liberty arise? In the case of
Justice Peckham's "liberty," the traditional and still for the most part
dominant story75 explains the creation of "liberty" in basically the
manner of which Justice Holmes complains. Justice Peckham's "liberty" is a specifically created liberty that was contrived for the sole
purpose of legitimating in law the laissez faire theories and assumptions of the social Darwinists.76 Because this "liberty," so the story
goes, was a specifically contrived concept, it would not be an ideograph, as it would not be a manifestation of the popular "feeling" at
the time. In terms of the legal interpretive theories discussed above,
Justice Peckham's opinion appears to be clearly one of legal pragmatism, of making the law fit a decision arrived at for reasons other than
a legal fit.
Justice Harlan's "liberty," on the surface, would also not appear
to be an ideograph because he is very careful to state nothing that has
not already been stated in earlier Court opinions. Justice Harlan's
"liberty" is constructed purely from the plain intent of the law and the
past precedents of the Court. It is true that, at least so far as Justice
Harlan's "liberty" does arise from the plain meaning of the law, and
that the plain meaning of the law represents the will and "feeling" of
the people, Justice Harlan's liberty could be an ideograph. However,
he is concerned far more with the process undertaken by the Court
than with the concept of "liberty" itself. Justice Harlan's opinion, in
the language of legal interpretive theory, is clearly that of the legal
formalist: the law is concerned only with the law, and should not concern itself with any questions of substance.
Justice Holmes' "liberty" at first glance appears to be most
closely associated with the concept of the ideograph. He defines liberty as part of the "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 77 The placement
of traditions of "our people" before "our law" does seem to indicate
that Justice Holmes is more concerned with what the people think
ought to be the case than with what the law says ought to be the case.
This is also consistent with the traditional story of Lochner, with Justice Holmes as the legal realist arguing for law as it ought to be, rather
than law as it is.
75. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1993).
76. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. Ia at 76.
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Peering just a bit beneath the surface, it is possible to see more of
the origins of these concepts of "liberty." The standard story of Justice Peckham's decision involving the legal legitimation of laissez-faire
principles was mythologized by most Constitutional scholars of the
early and mid-20th century. Kelly and Harbison saw in Peckham's
decision the power of the post-Civil War Republican party and its emphasis on the rights of big business.7 8 Swisher described the decision
as an instance of the majority reading into the law their personal beliefs in laissez-faire economic theory.79 Wiecek described the Lochner
decision as an archetype of the process of judge preference as opposed
to judicial deference."
Therefore, this standard story seems to make clear that the majority decision in Lochner was not a manifestation of the ideograph.
Justice Peckham's decision was made with a preconceived notion of
what liberty should mean, a notion that arose not from popular understanding, but from the "pens of an intellectual elite," and as such was
a product of what McGee termed "social idealism." Given that the
process that Justice Peckham apparently followed in coming to this
decision was a process of legal pragmatism, it seems that the process
of legal pragmatism does not lead to a popular conception of liberty.
There is, of course, another side to this issue. Many contemporary scholars have questioned the standard story of Lochner, and have
argued that the case is not an example of legal pragmatism or the
reading into the law a personal preference. Instead, these scholars
argue that the Lochner decision is best understood as an attempt by
the Court to come to a decision that was both grounded in precedent
(thereby meeting the traditional function of the law as understood in
legal formalism), and represented the popular understanding of the
people of that time.81 In other words, in this understanding of Lochnet, the concept of liberty proposed by Justice Peckham was not simply a preconceived notion created by the pen of Herbert Spencer, but
was an actual attempt at rendering an accurate representation of the
people.
Very briefly, Gillman summarizes the arguments for this alternative reading of Lochner by demonstrating that the decision in Lochner
was not a case of the Court reading in a specific preference for laissezALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (1948).

78.
ITS

79.
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HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:

CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
80. WILLIAM WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW (1988).

81. GILLMAN, supra note 75, at 6-10.

(1943).
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faire capitalism, but was instead an attempt by the Court to preserve
both precedent and public opinion. The decision in Lochner was not
about laissez-faire theory, but was instead a continuation of the
Court's work in overturning laws that violated the Jacksonian principle of true equality that there be no discrimination between classes of
people.82
In this story of Lochner, the concept of "liberty" appears to be
much more an ideograph. The "liberty" that was used within the
Lochner case was not a simple creation, but an accumulation of the
years of experience and understanding of the people of that time.
This idea of "liberty," then, was as much as possible a true representation of the feelings of those people, and their understanding of what it
meant to be free and to function in society. This "liberty" expressed
both the symbolic and, especially after Lochner, the material conception of the term.
IV.

Conclusion: Legal Interpretation, The Ideograph,
Spheres and Implications

In the earlier discussion of legal theory, the different theories of
interpretation were briefly described. Legal formalism, though never
the complete master it was purported to be, is still the dominant mode
of interpretation, at least in the eyes of the public. One need only pay
some attention to the public hearings for new Supreme Court justices
to-hear the debate between those who call for the law to be discovered
and those who believe that sometimes the law needs to be made.
Legal formalism, as a theory of interpretation, and even if adhered to more in name than in substance, is a theory that places the
law above the public. The law is a knowable, or at least discoverable,
entity. It grows, but it grows in predictable directions. Additions to
the law are not new; they are simply extensions of existing law. In this
theory of legal interpretation, the public has little if any role. SpeciaUy-educated practitioners, with a base of knowledge that is apart
from public opinion, make decisions that affect the public but are not
a part of the public. In terms of argument theory, legal decisionmaking in the mode of legal formalism is quite clearly part of the technical
sphere.
In the Lochner case, however, the evidence seems to indicate that
legal formalism is and should be a part of the public sphere. The revisionist history of Lochner indicates a case that was decided by the
82. GILLMAN, supra note 75, at 7.
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process of legal formalism, but that was inextricably linked to the public understanding of the concept of liberty. Not only did the Justices
utilize the understanding of the public, they felt that, to be true to the
principles of the law, they were bound by it.
In debates over the appropriate manner in which to interpret the
law, the role of the lay public is usually championed only by those who
consider the law to be an instrument of social policy, whether they be
from the traditional left (realists) or the traditional right (legal economists). Legal formalism, and its many variants, including original intent and plain meaning, are usually depicted as being separate from
the public. In the Lochner case, however, a new picture of legal formalism emerges.
This legal formalism cannot exist without the public sphere. If
you seek the original intent of a law, statute, or constitutional amendment, you seek the public's understanding of that law and not just the
legal profession's understanding. Similarly, the plain meaning of a law
is plain only to the extent that it represents the popular understanding
of the people at the time the law was written. Legal formalism, it
appears, is not at all above or separate from the public.
What this can mean for both argument and legal scholars is fairly
evident. The time has come to stop the endless and somewhat meaningless debate between legal formalists and legal realists. Even when
law is conducted according to the strictest understanding of the most
conventional formalist, the public is involved. The formalist never can
work with just the law, for the law is always more than the record of
past courts.
When we analyze the law as rhetoric, we need to look beyond the
personalities of the Justices, and beyond the quasi-logic that appears
to support the decisions. We need to look a little deeper and attempt
to see the public arguments that created the material for that original
and now disputed law, and created the conditions for the judicial decision. We have long known that stare decisis is only a part of the process of understanding legal decisioumaking. Going beyond the
conventions of labeling a decision or process one of formalism or realism to understanding the process regardless of the label is a formidable task. It is also a more thorough way to understand the
relationship between the rhetoric of the law and the rhetoric of the
public.

